- Remove package-lock.json: the server uses no npm packages, which the
invariants check enforces (no supply chain to attack).
- Allow the two hosts the server really calls in .github/allowed-hosts.json:
cdn.jsdelivr.net (Twemoji pictures, lib/emoji.js) and vision.googleapis.com
(the optional SafeSearch check, lib/image-moderation.js). The github.com
mention in lib/emoji.js was only a comment, now reworded.
- logText strips line feeds with .replace(/\n/g, ""), the form CodeQL's
js/log-injection recognises as a sanitiser. The old [\r\n]+ to a space was
just as safe, but not recognised, so every log line using it was flagged
(34 alerts on main, 35 on this branch).
- /authenticate: the saved sign-in is decided by what the server finds for
the refresh token, not by whether the request has one
(js/user-controlled-bypass). A token that is not good is still refused
with error_code 100.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Security workflow, on every push, pull request and weekly:
- invariants: no npm packages, no child_process/vm/eval in the server,
no web address outside .github/allowed-hosts.json in the server or in
the SWFs players load, no committed keys, all JavaScript parses
- secrets: TruffleHog over the pushed commits
- codeql: security-extended queries for the JavaScript and the workflows
Commit messages are checked against Conventional Commits; the commits
publish-public.sh makes are exempt. Actions are pinned to commit SHAs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>