fix(ci): pass the security invariants and clear the code-scanning alerts

- Remove package-lock.json: the server uses no npm packages, which the
  invariants check enforces (no supply chain to attack).
- Allow the two hosts the server really calls in .github/allowed-hosts.json:
  cdn.jsdelivr.net (Twemoji pictures, lib/emoji.js) and vision.googleapis.com
  (the optional SafeSearch check, lib/image-moderation.js). The github.com
  mention in lib/emoji.js was only a comment, now reworded.
- logText strips line feeds with .replace(/\n/g, ""), the form CodeQL's
  js/log-injection recognises as a sanitiser. The old [\r\n]+ to a space was
  just as safe, but not recognised, so every log line using it was flagged
  (34 alerts on main, 35 on this branch).
- /authenticate: the saved sign-in is decided by what the server finds for
  the refresh token, not by whether the request has one
  (js/user-controlled-bypass). A token that is not good is still refused
  with error_code 100.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
SnipzilandClaude Opus 5.5 committed 2026-10-17 21:55:48 -04:00
1 parent d8a9c1f881
commit ee06e8ca77
5 files changed
+15 -25

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+2
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@@ -2,8 +2,10 @@
"server": [
"ajcontent.akamaized.net",
"burrow.moe",
"cdn.jsdelivr.net",
"challenges.cloudflare.com",
"play.burrow.moe",
"vision.googleapis.com",
"www.cloudflare.com",
"www.w3.org"
],
+1 -1
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@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ const {logText} = require("./logtext.js");
// pictures of emoji, for the patched client's chat bubbles (gui.ChatBalloon):
// the game's font has none, so an emoji typed in chat (with Windows' emoji
// panel, say) is drawn as one of these. they are Twemoji's (CC-BY 4.0,
// https://github.com/jdecked/twemoji), asked of config.emojiUpstream once
// jdecked/twemoji on GitHub), asked of config.emojiUpstream once
// each and kept in data/emoji. a name is the emoji's code points in hex,
// joined by "-", as Twemoji names its files ("1f600", "1f468-200d-1f469").
+8 -8
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@@ -497,17 +497,17 @@ const authenticate = async (req, res, from) => {
// stands in for them; one that is not is refused here, whatever else
// the request says. (Whether the request offers a token is not what
// decides: only the server's own answer for it.)
if (body.refresh_token !== undefined) {
const saved = accounts.byToken(body.refresh_token);
if (!saved) {
failuresByAddress.record(from.key);
// error_code 100 = expired refresh token
send(res, 401, {error_code: 100});
return;
}
const saved = accounts.byToken(body.refresh_token); // null for none, or for one that is not good
if (saved) {
await signInChecked(res, body, from, saved, true, device);
return;
}
if (body.refresh_token !== undefined) {
failuresByAddress.record(from.key);
// error_code 100 = expired refresh token
send(res, 401, {error_code: 100});
return;
}
// a password is not looked at before the captcha. the custom client
// knows these errors; the official launcher shows them as a wrong password.
const captchaProblem = await captcha.check(body, from, "login", accounts.byName(accountKey));
+4 -1
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@@ -7,8 +7,11 @@
// cursor about. (U+2028 and U+2029, which end a line too, are in the second.)
const OTHER_BREAKS_AND_CONTROLS = new RegExp("[\x00-\x1f\x7f-\x9f\u2028\u2029]", "g");
// (line feeds go first, and to nothing: the form code scanning knows as a
// log's sanitiser. carriage returns, and the rest, are then replaced.)
const logText = value => String(value)
.replace(/[\r\n]+/g, " ")
.replace(/\n/g, "")
.replace(/\r/g, " ")
.replace(OTHER_BREAKS_AND_CONTROLS, "?");
module.exports = {logText};
-15
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@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
{
"name": "aj-classic-private-server",
"version": "0.1.0",
"lockfileVersion": 3,
"requires": true,
"packages": {
"": {
"name": "aj-classic-private-server",
"version": "0.1.0",
"engines": {
"node": ">=22.5"
}
}
}
}