From 92ebb4d07cb7632d81364ff8b0b452760cb82f9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Snipzil Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2026 22:23:18 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] fix(limits): behind Cloudflare, a visitor is their CF-Connecting-IP With a trusted local proxy the address was the last X-Forwarded-For hop, which behind Cloudflare is Cloudflare's own edge: every visitor shared a handful of addresses for the rate limits, and the Turnstile check was sent an edge as remoteip. When that last hop is in Cloudflare's published ranges (https://www.cloudflare.com/ips/), CF-Connecting-IP is used, if it is an address. From anywhere else the header is ignored: someone who reaches the server directly could otherwise name any address, past the rate limits, address bans and AJ_ADMIN_ALLOW. Neither header is read unless config.trustedProxy is on and the request came from loopback. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- lib/limits.js | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/lib/limits.js b/lib/limits.js index b6d8602..c59be7c 100644 --- a/lib/limits.js +++ b/lib/limits.js @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ "use strict"; +const net = require("net"); const config = require("../config.js"); // small in-memory rate limits for the parts of the server that strangers can @@ -28,6 +29,25 @@ const key = address => { const isLoopback = address => LOOPBACK.includes(String(address || "").replace(/^::ffff:/i, "")); +// the addresses Cloudflare's edge connects from, as it publishes them at +// https://www.cloudflare.com/ips/ (they seldom change; add any new range here). +const CLOUDFLARE = new net.BlockList(); +for (const range of ["173.245.48.0/20", "103.21.244.0/22", "103.22.200.0/22", "103.31.4.0/22", "141.101.64.0/18", + "108.162.192.0/18", "190.93.240.0/20", "188.114.96.0/20", "197.234.240.0/22", "198.41.128.0/17", "162.158.0.0/15", + "104.16.0.0/13", "104.24.0.0/14", "172.64.0.0/13", "131.0.72.0/22"]) { + const [prefix, bits] = range.split("/"); + CLOUDFLARE.addSubnet(prefix, Number(bits), "ipv4"); +} +for (const range of ["2400:cb00::/32", "2606:4700::/32", "2803:f800::/32", "2405:b500::/32", "2405:8100::/32", + "2a06:98c0::/29", "2c0f:f248::/32"]) { + const [prefix, bits] = range.split("/"); + CLOUDFLARE.addSubnet(prefix, Number(bits), "ipv6"); +} +const fromCloudflare = address => { + const family = net.isIP(address); + return family !== 0 && CLOUDFLARE.check(address, family === 4 ? "ipv4" : "ipv6"); +}; + // is this address the server's own machine, and does that count for // anything here? (It must not when a local reverse proxy forwards everyone.) const isTrustedLocal = address => config.trustLocalRequests && isLoopback(address); @@ -45,7 +65,17 @@ const clientOf = req => { const own = String(req.socket.remoteAddress || "").replace(/^::ffff:/i, ""); const forwarded = req.headers["x-forwarded-for"] || req.headers.forwarded || req.headers["cf-connecting-ip"] || req.headers["x-real-ip"]; const hops = String(req.headers["x-forwarded-for"] || "").split(",").map(hop => hop.trim()).filter(Boolean); - const address = config.trustedProxy && isLoopback(own) && hops.length ? hops[hops.length - 1].replace(/^::ffff:/i, "").slice(0, 60) : own; + // the last X-Forwarded-For entry is the one the local proxy appended: who + // connected to it (the first is whatever the visitor sent, so it is never + // used). Behind Cloudflare that is Cloudflare's own edge, which made every + // visitor one address (and left remoteip out of the Turnstile check), so + // then CF-Connecting-IP is the visitor. Only when that hop is Cloudflare: + // anyone who reaches the server directly can send the header too. Neither + // header counts unless the local reverse proxy has been trusted. + const lastHop = (hops.at(-1) || "").replace(/^::ffff:/i, ""); + const cloudflareAddress = String(req.headers["cf-connecting-ip"] || "").trim().replace(/^::ffff:/i, ""); + const reported = net.isIP(cloudflareAddress) && fromCloudflare(lastHop) ? cloudflareAddress : lastHop; + const address = config.trustedProxy && isLoopback(own) && reported ? reported.replace(/^::ffff:/i, "").slice(0, 60) : own; const direct = isLoopback(own) && !forwarded; return {address, key: key(address), direct, local: direct && config.trustLocalRequests}; };